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presents the following
findings: 26.7 percent
percent
following findings:
members of the government
of the members
positions in the corporate
corporate elite
government elite have held positions
(Dye,
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indicators of corporate
Dye and Domhoff
DomhofI differ
differ in that
Turning
corporate elite status, Dye
15
or
20
wealthiest
corporations
while
Dye
Domhoff looks only
to
the
wealthiest
(1976:
Dye (1976:
corporations
only
area (100
20)
particular area
all of those controlling
assets in the particular
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problem, however,
of corporate
"levels"
tunity to compare
backgrounds
of
those
different
"levels"
corporate
at
different
the
tunity
compare
backgrounds
elite status.
Dye's inclusion of corporation
corporation directors
directors
status. Another difference
difference is with Dye's
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of
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and government
backgrounds
(1) Domhoff's estimation of
corporate and
government elites: (1)
a high
proportion of cabinet members
members having
having upper
upper class background
background is reinhigh proportion
forced by
(2)
the
corporate
elite
defined
restrictive
by Mintz's
Mintz's study;
in more restrictive
As
defined
is
(2)
study;
corporate
terms, the higher
percentage recruited
recruited from
upper class backgrounds
backgrounds (this
from upper
terms,
higher the percentage
was suggested,
by earlier
backgrounds-for
studies of elite backgrounds-for
earlier studies
suggested, but not followed up
up by
example,
see
Keller,
1963:209-10,319);
(3)
Viewing
President's
Cabinet
the
President's
Cabinet
Keller, 1963:209-10, 319); (3) Viewing
example,
the top
of
government
elite,
Mintz's
show
a
high
percentage
as the
the
data
Mintz's
top
government
high percentage of inpercent to 25 percent
percent in Dye's
Dye's expanded
expanded
dividuals from
from the upper
dividuals
(66 percent
upper class (66
upper class backgrounds
backgrounds increase as more limited ingovernment elite).
elite). Thus, upper
government
(4) When looking
looking to corporate
corporate elite
dicators of a government
used; (4)
dicators
are used;
government elite are
backgrounds
among
members
of
the
government
elite
corporate
backgrounds
members
backgrounds among
corporate backgrounds
government
appear
prevalent the
government elite
more restrictive
definition of the government
the more
restrictive the definition
appear more prevalent
and the
is (63.4
percent to 26.7 percent
percent with
larger government
with Dye's
(63.4 percent
elite), and
government elite),
Dye's larger
more inclusive the definition
(Le., Freitag's
Freitag's definition).
definition of the corporate
corporate elite is (i.e.,
Interlock
Elite Interlock
Elite interlock
individual simulinterlock can be described
an individual
described as the situation
situation in which an
from the study
positions. This is different
taneously
different from
more elite positions.
study of
taneously holds two or more
elite backgrounds
backgrounds because in the case of elite backgrounds
backgrounds we are
are dealing
dealing with
with
an elite individpositions held by,
by, an
the previous
previous characteristics
individcharacteristics of, or institutional
institutional positions
ual (a dynamic
view); but with the study
interlock we are
are concerned
dynamic view);
study of elite interlock
with the overlap
point in time (a static view).
view). An
positions at one point
overlap between elite positions
of nafor
students
interlocks is a subject
of
major
for
students
examination of elite interlocks
concern
major
subject
tional power
tional
power distribution
interlocks, the greater
numerous the interlocks,
distribution because the more
more numerous
greater
key positions
positions held by
by the same individuals;
individuals; thus,
power
the number
number of key
thus, the more power
positions.
is concentrated
concentrated in the hands
individuals or positions.
hands of a few individuals
134) examined the extent of interlock
Dye (1976:
interlock between the government
(1976:134)
government
Dye

and other elite positions
positions and
and greatly
only 19.4 percent
percent
that only
emphasized the fact that
greatly emphasized
of the government
are so interlocked.
interlocked. Most of these
government elite positions
positions in his study
study are
positions (91.2
percent) are
public interest
sector. This is
are in what he calls the public
interest sector.
(91.2 percent)
hardly surprising
when
we
consider
that
government
officials
are
prevented
are
consider
that
officials
from
hardly
surprising
prevented from
government
positions which will result
interest. To study
study ties
result in conflicts
conflicts of interest.
holding other positions
between government
government and corporate
must, therefore,
therefore, examine elite
elites, one must,
corporate elites,
backgrounds (or dynamic
interlocks) as has been done by
by some of the researchresearchbackgrounds
dynamic interlocks)
ers
ers discussed in the previous
previous section of this
paper. For this reason
restrict
reason we will restrict
this paper.
this section to interlocks
our concern in this
sector.
interlocks within
within the economic sector.
As Sonquist
and Koening
196) put
put it, "It is important
important to focus attenSonquist and
(1975:196)
Koening (1975:
tion on the specific
nature of interlocks
an understanding
interlocks because an
specific nature
understanding of the relationships
firms can tell us much
much about the dynamics
tionships between interlocking
dynamics of
interlocking firms
and control in the U.S. political
is especially
political economic system."
This
especially
power and
system."
critical when we consider
dominated increasconsider the extent to which the economy
economy is dominated
by a smaller
number of giant
giant corporations.
corporations. For example,
Dye's (1976:
smaller number
(1976:
ingly by
example, as Dye's
data show, in 1970, more
20) data
percent of the industrial
assets are
are conindustrial assets
more than
than 50 percent
20)
trolled by
trolled
by 100 of the more than
importance
than 200,000
200,000 corporations.
greater importance
corporations. The greater
interlocks with
of interlocks
corporations
also
indicated
by
research
which
shows
with top
research
is
indicated
top corporations
by
that the corporations
that
are
corporations on top
top in the past, are
top today,
contrary to those on top
today, contrary
more likely
more
likely to stay
this
1969:536). Also important
(Mermelstein, 1969:536).
stay on top
important in this
top (Mermelstein,
question of economic concentration
showing that
just 21 corpothat just
concentration is the new data showing
rate
the top
rate investors
investors are
5
stockholders
over
half
of
top 122
are found in the top
in
stockholders
top
corporations (Subcommittee of Governmental
Affairs, 1978:
1). Thus, the numGovernmental Affairs,
1978:1).
corporations
ber of interlocks
among these top
increasingly important.
important.
interlocks among
top corporations
corporations becomes increasingly
Turning first
first to Dye's
Dye's (1973,
recent research,
research, we note that
(1973, 1974, 1976)
1976) recent
Turning
"44% of all
positions were interlocked
top positions"
positions"
all top
interlocked with other top
top corporate
corporate positions
(see Table 2).
interlocks involving
incumbents
of
top
corporate
incumbents
2). Most of the interlocks
top corporate
involving
positions were within
percent) rather
rather than with other
within the corporate
sector (72
(72 percent)
positions
corporate sector
sectors. Though
by Dye
Dye on how
are given
Though they
given by
they would be interesting,
interesting, no figures
figures are
What we do
many individuals
percent interlock
interlock in positions.
positions. What
individuals account for this 44 percent
many
and pubknow is that while 40 percent
percent of all positions
positions (government,
corporate,
(government, corporate, and
lic interest
interlocked, only
only 20 percent
percent of the 4,101 individuals
individuals
interest sectors) are
are interlocked,
for these interlocked
interlocked positions;
positions; and there
there is a lifetime average
average of 11.1
account for
elite positions
positions held
by corporate
individuals (Dye,
130, 135).
held by
1976:130,
135). Because
(Dye, 1976:
corporate elite individuals
how many of
Dye's
data
include
only
the
top
100
corporations,
he
say
include
cannot
Dye's
only
corporations,
top
addithe corporate
elite
are
interlocked
with
corporations
below
the
top
are
interlocked
top 100. In addicorporate
corporations
tion, it would be interesting
interesting to know the amount
amount of interlock
interlock among
corporate
among corporate
directors only
presidents), and
pattern and
and types of
directors
and the pattern
only (excluding
(excluding corporate
corporate presidents),
interlocks
interlocks among
among the various
various corporations.
corporations.
A recent study
answers a few of these questions.
questions. Allen
(1974) answers
study by
by Allen (1974)
( 1974: 399) examined the amount
amount of interlock
interlock among
directors of the 200
200
(1974:399)
among the directors
and found
largest nonfinancial
institutions and
nonfinancial corporations
financial institutions
largest
corporations and 50 largest
largest financial
(see our Table 2) that these corporations
corporations and
institutions had an averaverfinancial institutions
and financial
(see
that
the
show
age
of
10.41
interlocks
1970.
This
was
divided
average
to
divided
in
also
interlocks
average
age
and
was 16.92 for the financial
industrial corporations,
for the industrial
financial institutions,
corporations, and
institutions, 9.62 for
7.41 for the remaining
remaining nonindustrial
interest is that the
nonindustrial corporations.
corporations. Also of interest
amount of assets
interlocks
number of interlocks
amount
assets held was strongly
correlated with the number
strongly correlated
(.57),
larger
controlled (.49,
directorate is controlled
(.49, larger
(.57), even when the differing
differing size of the directorate

View)
Table 2. Economic Elite Interlock (Static View)
Study
Study
1. DYE
1.
Total Corporate
Corporate Interlocks*
Interlocks* (positions
(positions with
with interlocks)
interlocks)
Interlock
Of Total Interlock
percent to other
other corporate
corporate positions
positions
percent
percent to public
public interest
interest positions
positions
percent
percent to government
government positions
positions
percent
2. ALLEN
ALLEN (1970
(1970 Data)**
Data) **
A verage interlocks
interlocks of corporations
corporations
Average
financial institutions
institutions
Average interlocks
interlocks of financial
Average
industrial corporations
corporations
Average interlocks
interlocks of industrial
Average
A verage interlocks
interlocks of non-industrial
non-industrial corporations
corporations
Average
DOOLEY (1965
(1965 Data)**
Data)**
3. DOOLEY
Average interlocks
interlocks of corporations
corporations
Average
financial institutions
institutions
A verage interlocks
interlocks of financial
Average
Average interlocks
interlocks of industrial
industrial corporations
corporations
Average
non-industrial corporations
corporations
A verage interlocks
interlocks of non-industrial
Average
A verage interlocks
interlocks to size
corporation * * *
size of corporation***
Average
less
billion assets
less than
than .5
.5 billion
assets
1.0
1.4 billion
1.0 to 1.4
billion assets
assets
1.5
billion assets
1.5 to 1.9
1.9 billion
assets
3.0
billion assets
3.0 to 3.9
3.9 billion
assets
5.0 and
billion assets
and over
over billion
assets

Findings
Findings

44.0%
44.0%
72.7%
72.7%
25.9%
25.9%
0.2%
0.2%
10.41
10.41
16.92
16.92
9.62
7.41
7.41

9.9
15.2
15.2
9.1
9.1
8.6
6.0
6.8
6.8
9.2
16.4
16.4
23.7
23.7

1970 (board
*Top 100 industrial, 50 banks, 18
18 insurance, 33
33 transportation,
communication, and utilities in 1970
transportation, communication,
of directors and
and presidents).
presidents).
***Top
*Top 200 non-financial and
and top 50 financial
financial corporations
directors).
corporations (board
(board of directors).
****Selected
**Selected categories from
from Dooley's
Dooley's table.

corporations
which was in press
more interlocks).
corporations having
interlocks). (See
(See Allen,
Allen, 1978 which
press
having more
simultaneously
with this
this paper.)
simultaneously with
paper.)
Another interesting
314) who collected data
data on the
is Dooley
(1969:314)
interesting study
study is
Dooley (1969:
interlocks
interlocks among
the boards
boards of directors
in the top
directors in
(200 nonamong the
corporations (200
top 250 corporations
financial
comparing
his
data
from
1965
with
a
similar
set
and 50 financial). By
with
similar
financial and
from
data
By comparing
for 1935, Dooley
for
the same (225
about the
found that
that the number
were about
number of interlocks
interlocks were
Dooley found
in 1935 and
in
and 223 in
in 1965, Dooley,
data with
with
In comparing
1969:315). In
Dooley's data
comparing Dooley's
Dooley, 1969:315).
Allen's (for 1970)
more interlocks
interlocks than
find that
that larger
than
1970) we find
larger corporations
corporations have more
316) lists
smaller ones (see our Table
smaller
lists aa progressively
Table 2).
2). Dooley
(1969:316)
progressively inDooley (1969:
interlocks
from
number
of
smaller
to
larger
corporations
creasing
number
interlocks
from
to
smaller
creasing
larger corporations (see our Table
as we
2).
much like the
the findings
the upper-class
2). Thus,
Thus, much
backgrounds of elites, as
findings on the
upper-class backgrounds
to the
is Dooley's
move closer to
the top
interest is
more interlocks.
find more
interlocks. Also of interest
top we find
((1969:317)
1969: 31 7) finding
that by
members who also hold executive
board members
finding that
by excluding
excluding board
positions
within
the
corporation,
the
average
number
of interlocks
with remaininterlocks with
within
the
the
number
remainpositions
corporation,
average
increased.
Soref's
(1976)
findings
confirm
that
board members
confirm
ing
members is
is greatly
increased.
Soref's
that
(1976)
ing board
findings
greatly
these men
men whose power
than executive posirather than
posipower comes through
ownership, rather
through ownership,
tion in
in the
tion
class backgrounds,
the corporation,
are more
to have
have upper
more likely
are
backgrounds, are
corporation, are
upper class
likely to

more concerned with major
decisions, and
influence
and are
are able to spread
major decisions,
spread a web of influence
to a larger
number of corporations.
however, nowhere near solving
larger number
are, however,
solving the
corporations. We are,
debate between those who argue
argue that
directors have more power
power
that the board of directors
argue that the executive officers
officers hold
(see Soref,
(see
Soref, 1976:360)
1976:360) and those who argue
more power (see Pfeffer,
Zald, 1969; Seider,
Pfeffer, 1972; also see Zald,
1977).
Seider, 1977).
Finally, Dooley's
Dooley's (1969:
316) findings
interlocks innumber of interlocks
Finally,
(1969:316)
findings show the number
financial institutions
volving financial
higher for
than for ininstitutions are
are much higher
financial (15.2)
for financial
(15.2) than
dustrial (9.1).
dustrial
399)
1970
data
show
even
more
extensive
finanfinan(9.1). Allen's (1974:
(1974:399)
cial interlocks
interlocks (16.9
financial interlocks
interlocks least frequent
frequent
(16.9 average),
average), with the 1935 financial
financial in(14.8
importance of financial
(14.8 average).
average). This seems to indicate the growing
growing importance
stitutions in the economy
stitutions
Affairs, 1978).
Subcommittee on Governmental
Governmental Affairs,
1978).
(see Subcommittee
economy (see
Allen (1974:
399) argues,
however, that this
related to the greater
this is related
(1974:399)
greater size (in
argues, however,
terms
terms of assets) of the financial
remains that their
their
financial institutions.
institutions. But,
But, the fact remains
terms of
influence is greater.
sphere of influence
greater. In identifying
groups (in terms
"tight-knit" groups
identifying 15 "tight-knit"
number
number of interlocks) in his 1965 data,
320) finds
finds these groups
(1969:320)
data, Dooley
groups
Dooley (1969:
have a recurring
pattern: at the centers or hubs are
found top
financial instituare found
institurecurring pattern:
top financial
tions. And also of interest
"indirect
interest is the recent findings
findings on what can be called "indirect
interlocks" (Bunting,
interlocks"
are tied,
situation in which two corporations
tied,
1976a,b), a situation
(Bunting, 1976a,b),
corporations are
are
not directly
through interlocks
corporation. These are
third corporation.
interlocks to a common third
directly but through
found to be increasing
increasing recently,
recently, and with a majority
corporations
majority of the host corporations
midpoint) in the financial
34) .
(third corporation
financial sector (Bunting,
1976a:34).
corporation or midpoint)
(Bunting, 1976a:
In related research,
and
Koening
(1975:
204)
began
their
work
their
with
research, Sonquist
(1975:204)
began
Sonquist
Koening
Fortune's top
11,290 directorships),
directorships), but
top 797 corporations
corporations in 1969 (including
(including 11,290
later reduced
reduced this
this number
number to 401 corporations
by including
including only
only those with at
corporations by
least double interlocks.
four types
types
interlocks. Using
(1972) sociometric method, four
Using Levine's (1972)
of corporations were identified:
members,
satellite
cliques,
identified: isolates, trivial dyad
dyad members,
and central
central cliques
major
and Koening,
1975:206). Of the last, 32 major
cliques (Sonquist
(Sonquist and
Koening, 1975:206).
central
central cliques
analysis (details on all of these are
identified for
for further
further analysis
cliques were identified
contained in their
interest are
are the financial
financial cliques.
their appendix).
cliques. These
appendix). Of special
special interest
tend to expand
non-financial cliques
cliques
outward toward
toward satellite cliques,
expand outward
cliques, while the non-financial
were more self-contained. One of the most important
important recent findings
findings on the infinancial in~conomy shows that
that financial
creasing
power of financial
financial institutions
institutions in the economy
creasing power
stitutions have influence
stitutions
interlocks with other corporations
influence not only
corporations but
only through
through interlocks
also through
major corporations
corporations (Subshares of stock in major
through the control of voting
voting shares
1978).
The
proportion
ownership
committee on Governmental
Governmental Affairs,
Affairs, 1978).
proportion of stock ownership
who
rapidly,
and
it
financial
corporations
often
institutions is increasing
and
is
financial
by institutions
corporations
increasing rapidly,
hold voting
this stock. In 1976, banks, investment
investment companies,
companies, and
voting rights
rights with this
insurance companies
insurance
percent of the voting
voting rights
corporate stock
companies held 34.8 percent
rights of all corporate
14). This
in the United States
States (Subcommittee on Governmental
Governmental Affairs,
1978:14).
Affairs, 1978:
of course brings
brings up
an
interesting
question
controls
the
voting
who
of
voting stock in
up
interesting question
the major
Affairs
Subcommittee
on
Governmental
Affairs
Governmental
their study,
the
Subcommittee
major banks. In their
study,
(1978:260) found,
principal stock voters in large
banks."
"the principal
found, "the
(1978:260)
are-large banks."
large banks are-large
The most important
Morgan and
number
and Company
important seems to be Morgan
Company which is the number
five of the top
(Bankamerica,
Citicorp,
one stock voter in five
nation
banks
in
the
top
N.Y.).
Manufacturers Hanover, Chemical N.Y. Corporation,
Trust N.Y.).
Manufacturers
Corporation, and Bankers Trust
In comparing
find few problems
problems with incompatible
indicators
incompatible indicators
comparing these studies we find
background research
such as those encountered
research (with the excepencountered with the elite background
exception of Dye's
Dye's research
research which includes corporate
directors). The
corporate executives with directors).

most significant
interlocks include
nature of corporate
significant findings
findings relating
corporate interlocks
relating to the nature
the following:
interlock among
fairly
directors is fairly
(1) The extent of interlock
following: (1)
corporate directors
among corporate
and has remained
through this
(2)
are not also
high, and
who are
remained so through
Directors
this century;
century; (2)
likely to be involved in
interlocks;
executives in the corporation
in these interlocks;
are more
more likely
corporation are
(3)
interlocks; (4)
powerful and
more interlocks;
and
(3) The larger
(4) A few powerful
larger the corporation
corporation the more
with large
important cliques
identified within
within this mass of interlocks,
interlocks, with
important
large
cliques can be identified
financial institutions
financial
institutions often at the center of these cliques;
and (5)
(5) The average
average
cliques; and
number
number of interlocks
interlocks leading
leading from
from financial
financial institutions
institutions has been growing
growing steadily, at least since 1935.
ily,
Elite Unity
Unity
The existence of elite unity
central importance
unity or cohesiveness is of central
importance for those
who argue
this imporfrom a ruling
class"
position.
argue from
ruling class or "governing
class"
imporposition. Given this
"governing
tance we would expect
that is not the case.
research on the question,
expect much research
question, but that
We might
unity exists when recalling
recalling the findings
that some basis for unity
findings
might conclude that
the
upper
class
backgrounds
of
many
elite
individuals.
But both sides
showing
the
individuals.
showing
upper
backgrounds
many
that common background
background alone is not enough.
agree that
With the exception
agree
exception of a few
enough. With
case studies
studies (for example
Baltzell, 1958),
1958), little has been done empirically
empirically on
example Baltzell,
this question
until the recent work
work of Domhoff.
question until
area, in which he uses qualitaqualitaDomhoff's (1974)
in this
this area,
research in
(1974) most noted research
tive and
and quantitative
Francisco's
methods,
contained
his
study
of
BoSan
in
his
is
quantitative methods,
study
hemian Club
Club and
nature
class
and Retreat.
demonstrate
the
upper
nature
of
Retreat. He attempts
the
to
demonstrate
upper
attempts
this organization.
finds 27 perthis
peran examination
examination of the membership
organization. Through
membership he finds
Through an
cent to be members
Pacific
members of the "most
San Francisco, the Pacific
club" in San
"most exclusive club"
Union Club.
percent of the resident
Club. He argues
members belong
that 38 percent
resident members
belong to the
argues that
upper class. In addition,
30) found
percent of the 411 "nonfound 45 percent
addition, Domhoff (1974:
upper
(1974:30)
resident regular
regular members"
upper class "blue
finally,
members" listed in
"blue books." And finally,
in other upper
Domhoff (1974:
31) interprets
interprets as a tie to the corporate
corporate elite the figures
(1974:31)
figures which
show "that
officer or director
largest industrial
"that at
at least one officer
from 40 of the 50 largest
industrial
director from
retreat in one
corporations
in
America
was
present"
at
the
Bohemian
Grove
retreat
at
corporations
present"
year, along
with directors
directors of 20 of the top
commercial banks, 12 of the top
year,
top
along with
top 25 commercial
25 life insurance
transportation, and
and 8 of the 25
insurance companies,
companies, 10 of the top
top 25 in transportation,
"were 'repretop
utilities. In total,
total, 29 percent
percent of Fortune's
Fortune's top
'repretop utilities.
corporations "were
top 797 corporations
sented' by
by at
director" (Domhoff, 1974:
32).
at least one officer
officer or director"
1974:32).
members of
Domhoff attempts
that the members
show, through
attempts to show,
through qualitative
qualitative methods, that
these organizations
gather not only
to
relax
socialize,
to
devote
their
but
also
their
and
relax
organizations gather
only
time to shaping
and political
political problems
problems (see
time
"consensus" on common business and
shaping "consensus"
for example,
are his
purposes, however, are
for our purposes,
1974:15-18). More interesting
example, 1974:15-18).
interesting for
and
upper
attempts
to
show
membership
interlock
the
various
clubs
clubs
various
between
interlock
upper
attempts
membership
(Domhoff,
1974:
105;
1975:
1
78).
With
a
statistical
class organizations
With
statistical
method
1974:105;
1975:178).
(Domhoff,
organizations
matrix (i.e.,
total matrix
for measuring
measuring the "centrality"
"centrality" of a club or organization
organization in the total
with many
the extent to which an
an organization
organizations),
many other organizations),
organization interlocks with
he is able to list what he claims are
and
are the most important
upper class clubs and
important upper
organizations
States.
By
using
listing
top
organizations
in
of
the
United
this
States.
top organizations he
organizations
listing
By using
finds
Fortune's top
top 797 corporations
have
at
least
one connection to
finds that
that 673 of Fortune's
corporations
just 15 clubs and
organizations. In Domhoff's (1975:
at least one of just
and upper
(1975:
upper class organizations.

the
179) words,
is even
impressive when
when we
we consider
consideronly
"this finding
even more
more impressive
words, "this
only the
findingis
25
25 corporations
top 25
in each
we see
that 25
25 of 25 industrials,
each category.
see that
Here we
industrials,25
top
corporationsin
category.Here
25 banks,
utiliof 25
banks, 23
24
of
25
transports,
24
of
25
utili23 of 25
25 insurance
25
insurancecompanies,
transports,
companies,
19 of 25
ties, 19
25 retails,
are connected."
connected."
and 18
18 of 25
25 conglomerates
ties,
retails, and
conglomeratesare
the skeptics
Not everyone
is convinced
by Domhoff's
Domhoff's work,
however. One
One of the
convincedby
work, however.
skeptics
everyoneis
is
show aa great
is Thomas
164; also
whose data
data also
also show
deal
ThomasDye
also our
our Table
Table 1)
(1976:164;
greatdeal
1) whose
Dye (1976:
of membership
membership in
in social
in general
percent), and
elite clubs
clubs in
in parparand 37 elite
social clubs
clubs in
general (75 percent),
the nonticular
ticular (44 percent).
percent). But
his data
only 38 percent
percent of the
nonBut his
data also
that only
also show
show that
military
government
elite
belong
to
these
clubs,
with
only
6
percent
belonging
to
with
elite
to
these
clubs,
militarygovernment
only percentbelongingto
belong
and those
any of the
the 37
In reflecting
findings, and
those of DomDom37 exclusive
exclusiveclubs.
these findings,
clubs. In
any
reflectingon these
hoff, Dye
Dye (1976:
163) writes,
judgment that
that club
membership is a
club membership
"It is
our judgment
is our
hoff,
(1976:163)
writes, "It
result
result of top
position-holding in
structure of society
society rather
rather than
than
the institutional
in the
institutionalstructure
top position-holding
an important
important independent
power ...
merely help facilitate
. . . the clubs merely
independent source of power

processes that
163) believes
believes the
low membership
occur anyway."
the low
that occur
membershipof
processes
(1976:163)
anyway."Dye
Dye (1976:
the government
club membership
the
elite "undercuts
to club
membership
attributedto
"undercutsthe
the importance
governmentelite
importanceattributed
by many
elite' writers."
writers."
by
many 'power
'powerelite'
the signifiIn
In assessing
Dye's position,
position, it
dismiss the
can dismiss
how he
he can
is difficult
to see
see how
it is
difficultto
signifiassessingDye's
that
would
cance
cance of club
by
saying
that
this
only
a
"process
that
would
club memberships
a
is
that
this
only "process
membershipsby saying
occur
occur anyway."
that club
membership is an
an
club membership
has never
maintainedthat
never maintained
Domhoff has
anyway." Domhoff
that such
such
"independent source
power." Rather,
Rather, Domhoff's
Domhoff's argument
argument is
only that
is only
source of power."
"independent
membership is
formation. Finally,
although
is aa source
source of unity
and consensus
consensus formation.
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lacks
elite
clubs, aa close
Dye
government
participation
at
reading
of
Domhoff's
(1974:
18)
list
speakers
at
the
1970
gathering
at
the
1970
Domhoff's
at
the
of
list
(1974:18)
gathering the
reading
speakers
Bohemian Grove
that though
though the
the government
may not
not be members
members
Bohemian
Grovesuggests
elite may
suggeststhat
governmentelite
of these
have an
role.
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overestimation of the
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the
findings
from
psychological
studies
on
how
group
this point
is suggest
that
the
from
group
suggest
psychological
findings
solidarity is
89-90). What
What we
we
is formed
formedsupport
his conclusions
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the
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upper class
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"policy forming
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Relations,
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for
Economic
Development,
the
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Committee for Economic Development,
Foreign Relations,
Council,
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research in
and elite sponsored
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Council, and
sponsored research
wealthy foundations
major universities
Domhoff, 1974).
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universities (see
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1974). For as Dye
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major

is by
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direction of policy
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The first
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question involves the upper
corporate elite membership
upper class and
interlock
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upper class status
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of particular
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of
the
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particular organizations.
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half
finds
Domhoff
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organizations.
members
(CFR) are
members of the Council on Foreign
Foreign Relations (CFR)
are listed in the Social
mainly with
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organizations Domhoff is content mainly
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members
ing their
their interlock
interlock with upper
matrix of overlapping
clubs. His matrix
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overlapping members
(see Domhoff, .1975:178)
few) the Business Council (.63,
(.63,
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.49),
the
Committee
for
Economic
Development
(.58,
.49,
.46,
.47),
.57,
.44,
for
.47),
.57, .44, .49),
Development (.58,
and the Council on Foreign
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(.37, .34,
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.34, .24,
Foreign Relations (.37,
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with just
just four
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clubs (Pacific
Club, California
overlap with
and Centurary
Club, and
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finds that 154
attention.
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107) finds
Council) is selected for special
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special
members
for
Who's
Who
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members of this
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(those
members
Who
Who's
in
members
listed
1971-72)
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hold 730 directorships
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finally, with a
and corporations.
directorships in 435 banks and
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"centrality" of several
hoff,
177-78), five
policy organizations
are listed in the top ten
five of these policy
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(with the Business Council listed as
as number
number one).
one).
finds that
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that
upper class ties to the major
foundations,
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65) finds
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foundations,
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members of
of the top
trustees are
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their trustees
two-thirds of their
assets), two-thirds
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boards of major
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corporations (15 perupper class (51
major corporations
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showing
that
one-third
another
in
ings
showing
study
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another
were listed in the Social Register and
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corporations.
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question of how these organiorganiIn attempting
assess Domhoff's work
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that
that
he
is able
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influence government
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government policy
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of
one
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only on a few "case
of
"case studies."
studies." An example
type
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work of Shoup
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torical analysis
Foreign Relations, how the CFR was estabtorical
Council on Foreign
analysis of the Council
lished by
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and its impact
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impact on major
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But for
data in
in this
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quantitative data
again to Thomas Dye (1976:
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simplistic: "The federal
federal
216)
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law-making
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compromise, as genlaw-making process
erally
political theory.
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'pluralist' political
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agenda
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directors of the major
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Dye's
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foundations, elite univerfindings on foundations,
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and "civic"
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separately. Dye
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individuals
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by Dye
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government
Assessing
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influence on government
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policy, there
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at least five
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(1) the
policy,
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extent of elite control of "policy
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(2) how the ideas or pol"policy forming
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funding
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(4)
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recommendations produced
produced by
by
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and policy
(5) how often the ideas and
put into practice
practice or written
written into law by
by the government.
these institutions
are put
institutions are
government. As
research discussed
the research
discussed in this
this section shows, we have some useful data on question 1, some limited
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information (mainly
from Domhoff, 1967; 1970)
1970) on quesques(mainly from
tion 3, much
much discussion, but little data
question 2, and almost nothing
nothing on
data on question
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and 5.
questions 4 and

Discussion
much additional
Though
additional research
research is needed, and
and we have not been able to conThough much
sider research
research on many
sider
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power elite debate,
imporin the power
debate, we believe some impormany points
tant conclusions can be drawn
this: Do the
drawn from
data. A major
from the data.
major question
question is this:
debate? Depluralist or the elitist side of the debate?
findings
findings lend more support
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that
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Dye's
data
his
that
statements
145)
spite Dye's (1976:11,
repeated
support
by refining
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status and
indicators of elite status
side, by
combining his
support either
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findings
from other works
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reviewed here,
here, the weight
apweight of evidence apfindings with those from
pears to fall
that
fall on the side of the elitists.
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recognize, however, that
pears
important to recognize,

there
there is a variety
from "conservative"
"critical." The
"conservative" to "critical."
theories, ranging
variety of elite theories,
ranging from
for either
present evidence is certainly
support for
sufficient to offer
offer unequivocal
certainly not sufficient
unequivocal support
of these elite theories.
theories.
It is safe to say
measured, not only
only are
are perperthat no matter
matter how elite status
status is measured,
say that
sons of elite background
background found
found in key
key positions
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far out of proportion
proportion to their
their
representation in the population,
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in some cases,
for example
representation
cases, for
example the cabinet
studied by
incumbents. Clearly
Clearly
posts studied
majority of the incumbents.
by Freitag,
Freitag, they
they comprise
comprise a majority
discernible patterns
interlock
and
influence
centering
discernible
patterns of intercorporate
around
influence
interlock
and
centering around
intercorporate
financial institutions
major financial
institutions have been discovered.
linkages
discovered. So have widespread
major
linkages
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between major
and several
patterns of
several exclusive clubs, as well as patterns
major corporations
corporations and
disproportionate elite input
policy formulating
organizations that have the
disproportionate
input into policy
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ear of government.
government.
Still,
clear. For instance,
Still, the meaning
instance, the
meaning of these findings
altogether clear.
findings is not altogether
decision
making
complex
process that
pluralists claim that
that governmental
a
is
pluralists
process
complex
governmental
making
involves the interplay
interplay of countervailing
pressure groups.
crucial question
question is
countervailing pressure
groups. The crucial
whether
whether or not the extent of elite overrepresentation
high governmental
posigovernmental posioverrepresentation in high
tions and
and policy
involvement
policy formulating
formulating organizations,
organizations, corporate
interlock
and
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interlock
corporate
in exclusive social clubs is sufficient
upset the
the power
power balance among
sufficient to upset
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insure that
interests. Is it sufficient
sufficient to insure
that an elite (or a coalition of three elites
peting
in the
the case of Mills'
considers
its way
way on decisions it considers
Mills' thesis) can and
and does have its
vital to its interests
broad range
pressure
interests even against
against the
the opposition
range of pressure
opposition of a broad
groups
representing
the
interests
of
the
majority
of
the
population?
interests
the
groups representing
population?
majority
much elite overrepresenThis question
rise to others.
others. How much
question immediately
overrepresenimmediately gives
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tation
background
tation would
would it take
take to insure
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such dominance?
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ingroup interests
interests or do they
act on behalf of ingroup
occupy high-level
they act in
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their official,
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obligations? In
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some of the most vital policy
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foreign affairs
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management
and the management
areas such as foreign
the economy,
of the
which policies
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which
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of
the
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the
benefit
which
economy, exactly
population?
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If elites do dominate,
reforms which, at least
rise of reforms
dominate, how does one explain
explain the rise
are opposed
ostensibly,
by elites (see
1975)?
al., 1976; Mollenkopf,
(see Mintz et aI.,
Mollenkopf, 1975)?
ostensibly, are
opposed by
None of these questions
this paper.
can
answered
by
the
findings
reviewed
in this
paper.
reviewed
be
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the
questions
by
findings
debate
over
the
distribution
of
power
are
central
the
larger
are
distribution
central
to
the
Nevertheless, they
power
they
larger
in American society,
suggestions as to how they
they might
might be atthus a few suggestions
society, and thus
tacked will be taken
taken up
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later.
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patterns of interlock
interlock and
overrepresentation that appear
appear reand overrepresentation
doubt
upon
peatedly
in
the
studies
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here
are
sufficient
to
cast
serious
studies
reviewed
here
are
sufficient
peatedly
upon
the pluralist
pluralist view of power
power in America. Given the
oriented assumptions
the conflict
conflict oriented
assumptions
of the pluralists
pluralists (Kerbo, 1975,
human nature,
nature, it is incumbent
incumbent
1975, 1976)
1976) concerning
concerning human
fullest exupon them
why any
them to explain
and why
upon
explain how and
group would not use to the fullest
any group
the opportunities
tent the
offered
by
disproportionate
representation
in
key
positions.
offered
opportunities
by disproportionate representation key positions.
While this
imply that
that an
that
this does not imply
an elite exercises total dominance, it suggests
suggests that
if opposition
being effective,
effective, it would have to be extremeopposition is to have any
any hope
hope of being
broadbased and
and highly
highly mobilized,
infrequently.
ly broadbased
are met only
that are
mobilized, conditions that
only infrequently.
ly
burden of proof
proof is on the pluralists
pluralists with
interlock
A similar
similar burden
with respect
respect to elite interlock
across
and unity
unity of purpose.
purpose. The patterns
patterns of interlock,
those
cutting
across
indusindusboth
interlock,
cutting
tries
about
commercial
(Subcommittee
on
Governmental
and centering
Governmental
tries and
about
commercial
banks
(Subcommittee
centering
Affairs, 1978;
well as
as those among
1978; Levine,
Affairs,
Levine, 1972)
"competitors" within a
1972) as well
among "competitors"
questions about
single
industry (Scheuerman,
about the role of
raise serious
serious questions
(Scheuerman, 1975)
1975) raise
single industry

competition
interest among
business comcomversuscoincidence
the business
coincidenceof interest
competitionversus
segmentsof the
amongsegments
Researchon
munity. Research
the National
National Association
Association of Manufacturers
Manufacturers (Burch,
on the
(Burch, 1973)
munity.
and
the U.S.
that there
and the
U.S. Chamber
Commerce (Collins,
there
Chamberof Commerce
(Collins, forthcoming)
suggeststhat
forthcoming)suggests
is aa strong
disagreement
between
big
business
and
small
to
medium-sized
firms
to
medium-sized
firms
and
between
small
business
strong disagreement
big
over such
the economy.
over
basic issues
government intervention
intervention in
in the
economy.
such basic
issues as
as the
the extent
extent of government
The former
formeris
is much
much more
more tolerant
because big
big business
business would
The
would
tolerantthan
than the
the latter,
latter, because
find it easier
easierto
to turn
turnsuch
are still
still left
left
find
intervention to
such intervention
And we
we are
own advantage.
to its
its own
advantage.And
with big
it
with
big business
business equipped
with
extensive
networks
of
interlock.
Again,
is
interlock.
networks
with
extensive
Again, is
equipped
to
used
necessary for
for pluralists
pluralists to
why
these
networks
would
not
be
used
to
pronot
be
to explain
networks
would
these
pronecessary
explainwhy
mote the
collectiveinterests
mote
the collective
interests of big
big business.
business. Specifically,
they could
be used
used to
to
could be
Specifically,they
and maintain
maintaintacit
distributionof
generate and
tacit understandings
understandings that
that would
lead to
to distribution
would lead
generate
shares
shares of the
the market,
consequent suppression
price competition,
market,consequent
competition,
aggressiveprice
suppressionof aggressive
on industry
in
industry
cooperation
in
pressing
the
government
to
minimize
the
tax
burden
burden
the
tax
to
minimize
the
cooperation pressing government
holdSalamonand
and Siegfried's
(see Salamon
property holdwith large
and those
those with
1977 findings)
Siegfried's1977
largeproperty
findings) and
and channeling
the largest
ings,
to favor
favor the
largest
the economy
in the
interventionin
ings, and
channelinggovernment
governmentintervention
economyto
firmsin
the concentraconcentrafirms
in particular
particular industries.
would promote
promote the
All of these
industries.All
these things
things would
tion of purchasing
tion
purchasing power
power away
from
the
general
public
by
preventing
from
the
competigeneralpublicby preventingcompetiaway
tive pressures
for busitive
pressures to
prices. They
it easier
busito lower
lower consumer
easierfor
makeit
consumerprices.
wouldalso
also make
They would
ness
to pass
on cost
ness to
pass on
in the
form of higher
prices and
and
cost increases
the form
increasesto
to the
the consumer
consumerin
higherprices
frustrateany
frustrate
progressive tax
move toward
We are
are arguing,
towardan
an effectively
tax system.
arguing,
any move
system.We
effectivelyprogressive
the pluralists'
in the
the interests
interests of major
major
again
using the
own assumptions,
it is
that it
is in
again using
pluralists'own
assumptions,that
them.
corporations
to
neutralize
the
disciplinary
pressures
of
the
market
upon
market
to
the
neutralize
the
corporations
upon them.
disciplinarypressures
Extensiveinterlocks
Extensive
interlocks could
facilitate
the
effective
pursuit
of
such
interests
such
interests
could greatly
facilitate
the
effective
pursuit
greatly
(Herman,
(Herman, 1973).
1973).
This brings
us directly
This
brings us
the issues
issues that
principal types
types of elite
elite
to the
the two
that divide
divide the
two principal
directlyto
and
theorists,
the
"conservatives"
(Dye,
1976;
Putnam,
1976;
Prewitt
and
Stone,
the
Prewitt
"conservatives"
Stone,
theorists,
(Dye, 1976; Putnam, 1976;
1973;
theorists (Anderson,
and "critical"
"critical"theorists
1973; Keller,
1974;
Keller, 1963;
1963; Baltzell,
(Anderson, 1974;
Baltzell, 1958)
1958) and
Birnbaum, 1969;
Domhoff, 1974,
Miliband,
Birnbaum,
1969; Bottomore,
1967; Miliband,
1970, 1967;
1966; Domhoff,
Bottomore, 1966;
1974, 1970,
1969;
Mills, 1956). Unlike
the pluralists
pluralists (i.e.,
(Le., Dahl,
Dahl, 1961,
and Rose,
Rose,
Unlike the
1969; Mills,
1967; and
1961, 1967;
1967), both
both of these
acknowledge the
the centralization
centralization of political
political and
and
these approaches
approachesacknowledge
economic
that
economic power.
power. Where
disagree
is
on
the
issue
in
whose
interests
that
interests
Wherethey
whose
in
is
on
the
issue
of
they disagree
control is
is exercised,
control
not such
power is
is ininand on
on whether
or not
such concentration
concentrationof power
whetheror
exercised,and
evitable (Kerbo,
often
evitable
between those
theory often
elite theory
two schools
schoolsof elite
those two
(Kerbo, 1975). Disputes
Disputesbetween
center around
aroundthe
center
upon collective
collective issues
issues
the question
one should
should focus
focus upon
whetherone
questionof whether
as
an
inevitable
to
as opposed
to
distributive
ones.
"Conservatives"
see
inequality
as
an
inevitable
as
distributive
see
ones.
"Conservatives"
opposed
inequality
aspect
from their
needs of organizaorganizafunctionalneeds
their functional
aspect of complex
societies, stemming
complex societies,
stemmingfrom
The
and not
tion,
not the
decision making.
making. The
the result
resultof conspiratorial
or capricious
elite decision
tion, and
capriciouselite
conspiratorialor
"critical"theorists
at
"critical"
theorists maintain,
however, that
not inevitable,
inevitable, at
such inequality
that such
maintain,however,
inequalityis not
least not
on aa scale
scale anywhere
least
not on
anywhere close
close to
to what
presently exists.
exists.
what presently
But
we come
On the
the
But here
here we
itself. On
come to
to aa division
the critical
criticalelitist
elitist camp
division within
within the
camp itself.
one hand,
one
hand, there
instrumentalists (Domhoff,
there are
are the
the instrumentalists
1967; Freitag,
1974, 1970,
1970, 1967;
(Domhoff, 1974,
Freitag,
1975;
who occupies
on the
who focus
focus their
their attention
attentionon
the question
1975; Mintz,
Mintz, 1975) who
occupies
questionof who
powerful positions
positions and
is linked
linked with
with them,
them, research
research that
that we
have been
been rerewe have
and who
who is
powerful
in this
viewing
paper. On
are the
the structuralists
(Harringthis paper.
structuralists(Harringthere are
the other
other hand,
On the
hand, there
viewing in
ton, 1976,
who argue
matters
that it matters
ton,
1976, 1970;
1970; Parkin,
1975) who
Parkin, 1971;
1971; Poulantzas,
Poulantzas,1975)
argue that
little who makes the decisions. As long
upon
system is based upon
long as the economic system
private ownership
profitability of the individual
individual firm,
and the criterion
criterion of the profitability
firm,
private
ownership and
and
long as
public pressure
pressure from
and as
as long
as there
there is public
strata on politicians
from all strata
keep the
politicians to keep

economy
"realistic" and "responsible"
that any
"responsible"
economy thriving,
thriving, the range
any "realistic"
range of decisions that
promote the profitabilprofitabilpolitician can make is restricted
restricted narrowly
politician
narrowly to those which promote
the
distribuof
business.
This,
the
structuralists
argue,
explains
only
why
distribuity
not
business.
structuralists
ity
only why
argue, explains
in both
tion of income has remained
constant
throughout
this
century
this
remained relatively
century
throughout
relatively
the United States and
Western Europe,
Europe, but also why
why such inequality
inequality will
and in Western
necessarily be perpetuated
perpetuated in the future.
future. Only
transformation of the economy
necessarily
Only a transformation
into one based upon
providing for
for human
human needs rather
rather than
than profitability
profitability (in
upon providing
Marx's
values)
is
seen
as
capable
Marx's terms,
as
terms, use values instead of exchange
capable of elimiexchange
nating the gross
inequalities that
that exist.
nating
gross inequalities
If present
present disagreements
"critical" elite theorists
theorists
and "critical"
"conservative" and
disagreements between "conservative"
and between instrumentalists
"critical" camp
within the "critical"
camp are
are to
structuralists within
instrumentalists and
and structuralists
be submitted
test,
we
devise
new
research
strategies.
research
submitted to an empirical
must
Espestrategies. Espeempirical test,
turn
we
are
cially
if
we
are
to
compare
is
with
be
must
turn to more
must
what
could
with
what
cially
compare
sophisticated historical
historical and
and comparative
(1970) has atsophisticated
comparative methods. Domhoff (1970)
Putnam (1976)
tempted to use historical
limited way,
and Putnam
historical methods in
in a limited
(1976) has
tempted
way, and
attempted to use comparative
comparative data.
hampered, however, by
by nudata. Both have been hampered,
attempted
merous
merous problems,
problems, espechl1ly
a
lack
of
comparable
data.
data.
especially
comparable

Program for
for Future
Future Research
Program

We need to consider what must
must be done if the debate
distribution of
debate over the distribution
progress beyond
beyond the state in
which we now find
find
in which
national level is to progress
power on a national
it. It will
will be helpful
problems of theory
building and
helpful if we explore
theory building
explore generally
generally the problems
testing.
testing.
fields
Hage (1972:
13) believes that
intellectual progress
progress was made in fields
that little intellectual
(1972:13)
Hage
such as biology
variable
biology until
that "field
non-variable to general
variable
until that
from non-variable
"field shifted from
general
concepts."
10) uses the example
an
(1972:10)
concepts." Rage
Hage (1972:
democracy: "Democracy
"Democracy is an
example of democracy:
either-or
either-or phenomenon,
phenomenon, a specific
non-variable or categorical
concept-regardspecific non-variable
categorical concept-regardless of the number
number of indicators
indicators we might
the concept
society
concept categorizes
categorizes a society
might have, the
that at
or political
political system
as
being
democratic
or
democratic."
It is obvious that
not
democratic."
democratic
system
being
terms.
present,
the
power
stratification
debate
has
viewed
in
precisely
these
terms.
stratification
been
present,
power
precisely
A first
first step
conceptualize the debate in
degrees of elite dominain terms
terms of degrees
step is to conceptualize
tion. Second, we must
must keep
mind several dimensions or aspects
aspects of elite domikeep in mind
nation or pluralist
pluralist competition,
four of which we have treated
treated in this
this paper,
paper, and
competition, four
each of which must
must be treated
treated as a continuum.
continuum.
This type
type of research,
only be able
presently
tell us what presently
able to tell
research, however,
however, will only
exists (Le.,
membership in the
upper class, degree
unity,
the upper
(i.e., degree
degree of elite membership
degree of elite unity,
rule or the outcome of
etc.). It can tell us little about
inevitability of elite rule
about the inevitability
etc.).
degrees of elite domination.
must turn
turn eventudomination. For answers
answers to these questions
degrees
questions we must
moved
ally
to
historical
and
comparative
analysis.
And
have
to general
historical
we
and
once
general
ally
comparative analysis.
from comparative
variable concepts,
position to benefit from
comparative
variable
concepts, we will be in a better position
and have
analysis. At the same time,
time, once we have come to some agreement
analysis.
agreement and
for the
perfected our indicators
debate (as we have
the debate
indicators for
the dimensions
dimensions involved in the
perfected
attempted in this
this paper),
paper), we will be able to generate
generate comparable
comparable data across
attempted
societies.
An example
in order.
order. Let us take the issue
are suggesting
here is in
example of what we are
suggesting here
of ties between corporate
and governmental
degree of elite concencorporate and
governmental elites. If the degree
tration
makes
little
or
no
difference
in
the
degree
of
inequality,
the structration makes
strucdifference
inequality, then the
degree

turalist argument
gains credence.
turalist
there is an inverse
inverse correlation
credence. If,
correlation
If, however, there
argument gains
between these variables,
position is strengthened.
then the instrumentalist
instrumentalist position
variables, then
strengthened. Such
findings also would be relevant
"conservative"-"critical" controversy
relevant to the "conservative"-"critical"
controversy
findings
structuralists and
among
elite
theorists
though
not
so
clearly
and
theorists
among
though
clearly as in the case of the structuralists
example, if the degree
degree of elite concentration shows little or
instrumentalists. For example,
instrumentalists.
no correlation
inequality, "conservatives"
argue that
that it
correlation with the degree
"conservatives" could argue
degree of inequality,
especially exploitative,
demonstrates that elites are
and that the inequality
demonstrates
are not especially
inequality
exploitative, and
that exists probably
advanced industrial
probably constitutes
an irreducible
irreducible minimum
minimum for advanced
industrial
constitutes an
and inconcentration and
societies. If, however, a positive
positive correlation
correlation between elite concentration
their posifor their
equality
"critical" theorists
theorists could claim support
discovered, the "critical"
equality is discovered,
support for
tion.
No doubt
type of research
problems.
will not be without problems.
doubt the
the type
research described
described above will
One of the greatest
greatest difficulties
finding societies that are
are comparable
difficulties will
will be finding
comparable in
most respects,
so
that
we
that
variance
in
one
factor,
such as class
that
in
found
know
variance
that
factor,
respects,
partially explained
explained by the
differences in income or working
differences
working conditions, is at least partially
variance in the extent of corporate
and government
ties. But until
until attempts
attempts
corporate and
government elite ties.
are made in perfecting
are
perfecting this
this type
type of analysis,
analysis, we will have little chance of resolving many
many of the issues separating
separating the various sides in the debate.
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